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THE EXTRAPOLATION CONUNDRUM: FINDING A UNIFIED 
THEORY FOR THE USE OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING IN 
MEDICARE FRAUD CASES BROUGHT UNDER THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT 
Thomas Reilly* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare fraud has become one of the federal government’s costliest 
problems.  The government spends over one trillion dollars every year on 
Medicare and Medicaid.1  Total spending on healthcare in America is around 
2.7 trillion dollars, roughly seventeen percent of the nation’s gross domestic 
product.2  Despite—or perhaps, because of—the massive amounts spent on 
healthcare, Medicare and Medicaid “have become a sitting duck for 
fraudulent activity.”3  In spite of constant attempts by both the FBI and the 
Department of Justice, Medicare and Medicaid fraud continues to cost the 
government—and thus taxpayers—billions of dollars.4  Indeed, though 
estimates vary, fraud and systematic overcharging are estimated to cost the 
government roughly sixty billion dollars every year, totaling roughly ten 
percent of Medicare’s annual costs.5 
This widespread fraud stems in large part from the fact that the 
Medicare and Medicaid systems are, by their very nature, vulnerable to 
fraudulent activity conducted by dishonest practitioners.  Indeed, the United 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Rutgers University. 
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 1  The $272 Billion Swindle, THE ECONOMIST (May 31, 2014), http://www.economist 
.com/news/united-states/21603078-why-thieves-love-americas-health-care-system-272-
billion-swindle. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Medicare: A System Ripe for Fraud, MEDICARE & MEDICAID FRAUD REPORTING 
CENTER, http://www.medicarefraudcenter.org/medicare-fraud-information/11-medicare-a-
system-ripe-for-fraud.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Medicare Fraud Reporting 
Center]. 
 4  Merrill Matthews, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud is Costing Taxpayers Billions, 
FORBES (May 31, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/05/31 
/medicare-and-medicaid-fraud-is-costing-taxpayers-billions/. 
 5  Reed Abelson & Eric Lichtblau, Pervasive Medicare Fraud Proves Hard to Stop, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/business/uncovering-health-
care-fraud-proves-elusive.html?_r=0. 
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States Government Accounting Office has labeled both the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs “high-risk programs.”6  Much of the problem stems from 
the fact that “the government pays [Medicare and Medicaid bills] on an 
honor system, requiring only electronic submission to claim for services or 
goods provided by a health care provider.”7  The relative ease with which 
health care providers can file a claim was originally designed to provide 
quick and efficient payment to doctors who could then treat the poor and the 
needy; but, in more recent times, this lack of oversight has made it all too 
easy for dishonest health care providers to exploit the system.8  To make 
matters worse, “[no] built-in checks and balances or due diligence exists to 
protect the Medicare giant from the onslaught of [fraudulent activity].”9  The 
sheer volume of health care claims submitted each year under Medicare and 
Medicaid only adds to the problem, as the government faces the seemingly 
unfeasible task of sorting out proper claims from fraudulent ones in a pool 
of millions of claims submitted by millions of Americans.10 
With executive, administrative, and institutional efforts failing to 
prevent widespread health care fraud, the government increasingly relies on 
an old, though still very useful tool: the False Claims Act.11  For many years, 
the federal government has considered the False Claims Act (FCA) to be its 
primary instrument in preventing fraud against the government.12  Today, 
private actions brought under the FCA play a “vital role” in fighting 
Medicare fraud.13  In 2014 alone, the Department of Justice recovered over 
two billion dollars in health care-related FCA actions.14 
But the FCA is not without its drawbacks.  Health care fraud cases 
brought under the FCA are often large, unwieldy affairs involving thousands 
of claims.15  Faced with the practical impossibility of sorting through such a 
 
 6  High Risk List, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/over 
view (last visited Apr. 23, 2016). 
 7  See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Medicare Program, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/ 
medicare_program/why_did_study (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); Medicaid Program, U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/medicaid_program/why_did_ 
study (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
 11  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 12  See S. REP. No. 99-345 at 1 (1986). 
 13  See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
 14  Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014) http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014. 
 15  Jeanne A. Markey & Raymond M. Sarola, 4th Cir. FCA Statistical Sampling Case is 
One to Watch, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712001/ 
4th-circ-fca-statistical-sampling-case-is-one-to-watch. 
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large volume of claims, the government and private relators have turned to 
statistical sampling—sometimes called “extrapolation”—as an efficient way 
to determine the characteristics of large sets of data.16  Statistical sampling 
is an economically efficient and scientifically accepted mathematical method 
for drawing inferences and generalizations about a large set of data based on 
a subset data.17  Furthermore, it has long been established that statistical 
sampling is a viable method for proving damages in FCA cases, and most 
courts have allowed its use for this limited purpose.18 
In recent years, the government has pushed towards using statistical 
sampling not only for proving damages, but for proving liability as well.19  
Courts have split on the issue; some have allowed statistical sampling for 
proving liability, some have allowed it only for proving damages, and still 
others have not allowed it at all.20  Yet there remains no unified theory for 
when and how statistical sampling should be implemented.  The courts that 
have addressed the issue have held for one approach or the other without 
espousing a guiding framework that can be applied on a case-by-case basis.  
Furthermore, courts addressing statistical sampling have taken ostensibly 
extreme approaches, allowing either an uninhibited use or, alternatively, a 
restricted approach that prohibits its use in almost every instance.21 
This Comment will argue for a middle ground between these extreme 
approaches while developing a single, unified framework for determining 
whether statistical sampling should be permitted in a given case.  Part II will 
provide a more detailed overview of the history and development of the FCA 
and the use of statistical sampling.  Part III will provide an analysis of the 
reasons courts have provided for allowing the use of statistical sampling, 
while Part IV will analyze the reasons courts have given for prohibiting the 
use of statistical sampling.  Finally, Part V will put forth a unified framework 
for the use of statistical sampling in FCA cases, while also explaining the 
 
 16  See id. 
 17  See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the 
Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969 (2007) (providing the history and scientific background 
of statistical sampling). 
 18  See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (D.P.R. 2000) 
(establishing that statistical sampling is generally permitted for establishing damages and 
providing an overview of cases that have permitted it). 
 19  Matthew D. Benedetto, Statistical Sampling on the Rise in False Claims Act Cases, 
L.A. DAILY J. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/ 
Editorial/Publications/Documents/statistical-sampling-on-the-rise-in-false-claims-act-
cases.pdf. 
 20  For concise arguments on both sides of the issue, compare United States ex rel. 
Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 
(D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (prohibiting statistical sampling), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 848 
F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017), with United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 
F. Supp. 3d 549 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (allowing statistical sampling). 
 21  See infra Parts III, IV. 
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framework’s origins and various rationales. 
As a preliminary matter, this Comment only addresses the issue of 
when statistical sampling should be used for proving liability.  It is well 
settled, with perhaps a few outliers, that statistical sampling is generally 
agreed to be permissible for calculating damages.22  Furthermore, this 
Comment will address only the use of statistical sampling in health care fraud 
cases brought in federal court under the FCA, and will not address statistical 
sampling in other contexts, such as mass tort cases, or in administrative 
rulings.23 
In attempting to create a unified framework for statistical sampling, this 
Comment will endeavor to reconcile the various cautions, concerns, and 
principles that have led courts to come out on different sides of the issue.  
This unified framework will provide for a cautionary approach to the use of 
statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA cases.  In particular, it will 
require the party proposing to use statistical sampling to show some 
legitimate reason for why the use of statistical sampling will be necessary.  
The effect will be to create what is in essence a rebuttable presumption24 
against the use of statistical sampling for proving liability, which can be 
overcome by a showing of hardship on the party proposing to use statistical 
sampling, or where claim-by-claim review is a practicable impossibility.  
The ultimate result of this approach will be a legal framework that allows the 
government and private relators to have access to statistical sampling in 
cases where it is necessary to prevent large-scale fraud, while also preventing 
its use in smaller cases where the benefits are slight and there is a large 
potential for abuse. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCA AND STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
A. The Humble Origins and Modern Power of the False Claims Act 
The FCA imposes liability on any person who knowingly presents the 
United States with a false or fraudulent claim for payment.25  Under the FCA, 
private individuals, legally known as “relators,” are permitted to bring suits 
in the government’s name, known as qui tam suits, for fraudulent conduct 
committed against the United States.26  The FCA was originally 
 
 22  See Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 240. 
 23  United States ex rel. Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (“Appeals from administrative 
agency decisions are distinguishable from [cases brought under the FCA] because they are 
considered by an appellate court under a different standard of review.”). 
 24  The term “rebuttable presumption” in this sense means a presumption against the 
legitimacy of statistical sampling in a given case that can be overcome by a showing of 
additional facts that warrant its use.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (6th ed. 1990). 
 25  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 26  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
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implemented during the Civil War as a way for the federal government to 
control fraud on the part of defense contractors.27  But as the federal 
government’s involvement in the national economy continued to grow 
throughout the Twentieth Century, and as pervasive fraud became ever more 
present, the once innocuous FCA began to take a more central role in the 
government’s attempts to prevent fraud.28  In the 1980s, against a backdrop 
of national efforts to encourage whistleblowing against health care fraud,29 
the FCA took on its current form.30  As currently constructed, the FCA 
imposes severe penalties on violators, including a provision for treble 
damages and fines of up to ten thousand dollars per claim.31  Private relators, 
for their part, receive substantial rewards ranging from between fifteen and 
thirty percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim.32  
Together, this system of penalties and rewards, which came to full fruition 
through the enactment of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, lay at the heart 
of an increasingly aggressive government scheme to root out fraudulent 
activity.33 
The aggressive enforcement scheme prompted by the 1986 
amendments to the FCA has fallen heavily—perhaps even 
disproportionately—in the field of health care.34  Indeed, the modern FCA 
has become a “nightmare for the health care industry,” as “[h]ealth care 
providers have discovered that billing errors once viewed as mistakes in need 
of correction, are now attacked as crimes that compel million dollar 
settlements.”35  The focus on health care fraud has also come in conjunction 
with a massive rise in litigation brought under the FCA since the enactment 
of the 1986 amendments.36  As an example, there were twelve qui tam cases 
brought under the FCA in 1987, compared to two hundred and twenty 
brought in 1994.37  Over seven hundred qui tam actions have been brought 
under the FCA in every year since 2010.38 
 
 27   See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic 
Evolves Into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998). 
 28  See id. at 459–61.  
 29  See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: 
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 275–
83 (1992). 
 30   See Meador & Warren, supra note 27, at 461. 
 31  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
 32  § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
 33  See Meador & Warren, supra note 27, at 460. 
 34  See Frank LaSalle, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of 
Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502 (1995). 
 35  See Meador & Warren, supra note 27, at 456. 
 36  See id.; LaSalle, supra note 34, at 500–02.  
 37  LaSalle, supra note 34, at 500–02. 
 38  2014 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 7, 2015), 
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With health care fraud now standing front and center in cases brought 
under the FCA, and with litigation on the rise, it is perhaps not surprising to 
find that the government is willing to push the boundaries of permissible 
methods of proving liability.  Statistical sampling now stands at the forefront 
of one of the largest and most important areas of federal litigation, and its 
fate as a tool for proving liability will have a massive effect in shaping the 
future of health care fraud litigation.39 
B. The History and Development of Statistical Sampling 
Statistical sampling is not a new evidentiary method.  On the contrary, 
and perhaps surprisingly, it has been used in litigation since as early as the 
1920s.40  And while statistical sampling has been used—if not always 
accepted—in litigation for nearly a century, it has been recognized as a 
legitimate mathematical methodology in the world of science for even 
longer.41  Statistical sampling was first permitted in a trademark case in 1940, 
and it had “gained full acceptance in trademark law” by 1963.42  By 1990, 
statistical sampling had made its way into mass tort cases.43  Today, courts 
and legal scholars generally recognize statistical sampling as a viable 
evidentiary method, and statistical reasoning and analysis is routinely used 
in “antitrust, employment discrimination, toxic torts, and voting rights 
cases.”44 
In general, statistical sampling is a methodology whereby a small 
sample of data is used to determine the characteristics of a much larger set 
of data.45  While the specific process sometimes differs based on a variety of 
complex factors, statisticians tend to adhere to several basic principles in 
order to minimize bias and ensure the highest degree of accuracy possible.46  
To put the matter succinctly, “a good survey defines an appropriate 
population, uses a probability method for selecting the sample, has a high 
 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-
Update.aspx. 
 39  See Benedetto, supra note 19. 
 40  See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 377–78 (D. Del. 1928) 
(disallowing the use of statistical sampling in a trademark dispute). 
 41  See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974 (“Sampling came to law later than to 
science.”). 
 42  Id. at 975. 
 43  Id. at 976. 
 44  David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 213 (3d ed. 2011). 
 45  See, e.g., id. (explaining the methodology and process behind the use of statistics in 
litigation); Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 970–79 (providing a history and general 
background on statistical sampling). 
 46  See generally Kaye & Freedman, supra note 44 (providing an in-depth explanation of 
statistical sampling methodology). 
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response rate, and gathers accurate information on the sample units.  When 
these goals are met, the sample tends to be representative of the population.  
Data from the sample can be extrapolated[.]”47 
To be sure, statistical sampling is not a matter of simple number 
crunching.  In fact, parties seeking to use statistical sampling in a particular 
case, even if just as a calculation of damages, will usually require the use of 
a statistician as an expert witness for purposes of developing the appropriate 
statistical method for the given facts and making the appropriate calculations 
for extrapolating the sample to the entire universe of claims.48  In health care 
fraud cases in particular, statistical sampling often involves complicated 
methods for determining “the population of interest” from among thousands 
of claims, while also “identify[ing] a data source from which the sample will 
be drawn” to fit into a “sampling frame” which “comprehensively reflect[s] 
the population.”49  With such complex calculations, and with so many 
variables in play, statistical sampling inevitably involves at least some 
margin for error.50 
While statistical sampling is a generally accepted evidentiary method, 
there is a large difference between the way in which statistical sampling has 
traditionally been used and the proposal for using statistical sampling as a 
means of proving liability in health care fraud cases brought under the FCA.  
Historically, statistical sampling has been used as a method either for 
determining damages or for demonstrating the external characteristics or 
beliefs of a population subset.51  For instance, in trademark cases, where 
statistical sampling first made its mark on the law, it was used primarily in 
regard to surveys as a means of demonstrating market confusion.52  In the 
context of mass torts, it has typically been used as a way to calculate damages 
and streamline large class-action cases involving similarly situated 
plaintiffs.53  But, “[w]hile it’s [sic] been widely used in complex civil 
 
 47  Id. at 226. 
 48  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-
JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 
848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., Inc., 114 
F. Supp. 3d 549 (E.D. Tenn. 2014). 
 49  United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-1303-T-23TBM, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55384, at *7–8 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015). 
 50  Kaye & Freedman, supra note 44, at 243–46. 
 51  See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974–77. 
 52  See, e.g., Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376–78 (D. Del. 1928) 
(discussing how the plaintiff attempted to use expert witness testimony to show that there was 
market confusion concerning the name “Elgin” based on a survey of two thousand 
consumers); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) 
(discussing how a random sample of five hundred people showed market confusion in relation 
to Zippo brand lighters). 
 53  See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 976–77. 
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litigation, statistical sampling has been rarely used in federal False Claims 
Act litigation.”54  Traditionally, where statistical sampling has been used in 
FCA cases, it has been used for determining damages and not for proving 
liability.55 
The application of statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA 
cases would thus be a fairly large step in the evolution of the use of statistical 
sampling in litigation.  In essence, using statistical sampling to prove liability 
in a health care fraud case brought under the FCA would involve taking a 
small sample of the total number of claims brought against the defendants, 
determining liability in the small sample of claims, and then, through the use 
of an expert witness statistician, extrapolating liability to the total universe 
of claims.56  This methodology, which involves proving liability through 
what is essentially a mathematical formula—and without any individual, 
claim-by-claim review—would be an extraordinary step in FCA litigation.  
Statistical sampling thus warrants a cautionary approach. 
III. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS COURTS HAVE GIVEN FOR 
ALLOWING STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
Courts that have allowed the use of statistical sampling have typically 
done so on the principle that statistical sampling and extrapolation are viable 
and accurate scientific methods with a long tradition of use in complex 
litigation.57  Other courts go further, reasoning that statistical sampling is the 
only viable way of determining liability and ensuring proper recovery in 
large-scale qui tam actions.58  These courts tend to see no reason why the 
basic methodology cannot be extended to proving liability, especially in 
cases involving a large number of claims.59  It is somewhat striking, however, 
that several of the courts that have allowed statistical sampling have 
endorsed an almost uninhibited use of statistical sampling, implying that the 
government and private relators should be free to use it whenever possible 
as a means of proving liability.60  This perhaps goes too far, as there are 
 
 54  See Benedetto, supra note 19. 
 55  Id. 
 56  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-34466-
JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (explaining the basic 
methodology), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017); United States ex 
rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (same). 
 57  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 
259, 261 (D. Mass. 2009); Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 560.  See also infra, Part III.B.  
 58  See, e.g., Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 571. See also infra, Part III.A. 
 59  See Loughren, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (noting that statistical sampling can be a 
“reasonable method” for proving liability); Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 563. 
 60  See, e.g., Loughren, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (suggesting that statistical sampling is 
suitable for proving liability so long as the “statistical methodology is appropriate”).   
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various drawbacks to its use. 
A. Statistical Sampling as a Practical Necessity 
The primary argument for allowing statistical sampling as a means of 
proving liability is that it is necessary to allow the government and private 
relators to efficiently prove liability.  As the court in United States ex rel. 
Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. stated succinctly: “[g]iven the 
large number of claims that can be submitted by a single entity to be 
reimbursed by Medicare, it is often not practicable to do a claim-by-claim 
review of each allegedly false claim in a complex FCA action.”61  
Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of the FCA as well as the development and 
expansion of government programs as to which it may be employed support 
the use of statistical sampling in complex FCA actions where a claim-by-
claim review is impracticable.”62  This sentiment was echoed in United 
States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, in which the court stated that 
it would allow the use of statistical sampling because, “[c]onsidering the 
large universe of allegedly false claims in the instant case, it would be 
impracticable for the Court to review each claim individually.”63  Economic 
considerations also played a part in this determination, as the court in Martin 
stated: “if the Court were to individually review each allegedly false claim 
or statement in this action, it would consume an unacceptable portion of the 
Court’s limited resources.”64 
These concerns may well be true in large cases, where there are 
thousands of claims under review.  In Martin, for instance, the defendant 
health care provider owned and operated more than two hundred nursing 
home facilities throughout the United States, and there were over one 
hundred thousand claims of fraud at issue.65  Likewise, in Ruckh, the claims 
against the defendant involved charges of fraudulent overbilling for patients 
at each of its fifty-three medical facilities throughout the state of Florida.66  
Indeed, both Martin and Ruckh distinguished an earlier case that had 
prohibited the use of statistical sampling, United States v. Friedman, on the 
grounds that it involved a substantially smaller number of claims.67  Unlike 
 
 61  Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 571.  
 62  Id.  
 63  United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No.8:11-cv-1303-T-23TBM, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55384, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015) (quoting Martin, 114 F. Supp. 
3d at 565). 
 64  Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 565. 
 65  Id. at 551, 556. 
 66  Ruckh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55384, at *2. 
 67  See id. at *8–10 (citing United States ex rel. Martin for the proposition that Friedman 
is distinguishable due to the smaller number of claims); Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 565 
(“Friedman is distinct from the instant case because there was a sufficiently limited universe 
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Martin and Ruckh, where thousands of claims were at issue, Friedman only 
contained 676 total claims.68 
But distinguishing Friedman only raises the question of how many 
claims are enough to warrant statistical sampling.69  There is no guiding 
principle to establish the point at which claim-by-claim review becomes 
unfeasible, and drawing a line at a particular number seems an 
unsatisfactorily arbitrary alternative.  To be sure, 676 total claims is not a 
small number, and the Friedman court gave no indication that its decision to 
not allow sampling was based in any way on the total number of claims.70  
Adding to the problem is the fact that the number of claims may not tell the 
whole story.  Depending on the facts and difficulty of the case, it may be 
more or less feasible to perform a claim-by-claim review.  Theoretically, two 
separate cases could have the same number of claims, but based on their 
facts, may be differently situated in regard to the feasibility of claim-by-
claim review.  Unfortunately, while both cases may in fact have been 
correctly decided, neither Martin nor Ruckh provides an answer to the 
question of how many claims are enough to warrant statistical sampling. 
B. Statistical Sampling as a Viable and Accurate Scientific 
Methodology 
Courts that have allowed statistical sampling also tend to focus on 
statistical sampling’s reputation as an accurate and legitimate scientific 
method.  In United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., for 
instance, the court allowed for the use statistical sampling while noting its 
belief that “extrapolation is a reasonable method for determining the number 
of false claims so long as the statistical methodology is appropriate.”71  The 
court in Martin adopted a similar confidence in statistical sampling, noting 
that “courts now consider ‘mathematical and statistical methods [to be] well 
recognized as reliable and acceptable evidence in determining adjudicative 
facts.’”72  And while the Martin court recognized that “using extrapolation 
to establish damages when liability has been proven is different than using 
 
of claims for the court to review each one individually rather than relying on extrapolation.”). 
 68  United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n.1 
(D. Mass. July 23, 1993). 
 69  The court in United States ex rel. Martin distinguished Friedman by its smaller number 
of claims, see 114 F. Supp. 3d at 565, but put forward no principle to determine at what point 
the number of claims becomes too large for claim-by-claim review. 
 70  See Friedman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n.1.  There is nothing in the Friedman 
opinion’s analysis to suggest the court based its holding on a sufficiently limited number of 
claims. 
 71  United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. 
Mass 2009). 
 72  Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 560 (quoting Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409 
(N.D. Ga. 1977)). 
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extrapolation to establish liability,” it nevertheless found no reason not to 
make the leap towards applying statistical sampling to a finding of liability.73  
Indeed, “the court’s opinion did not significantly engage with the damages/
liability divide.”74  It appears, at least in the view of courts adopting statistical 
sampling as a means of proving liability, that the same scientific legitimacy 
that allows for statistical sampling to be used in calculating damages is 
equally applicable for using it as a means of proving liability.75 
But whether this is actually true is a closer call than the court opinions 
in Martin, Ruckh, and Loughren lead on.  Statistical sampling is, after all, an 
imperfect method, especially when used to prove a point.76  Statistics are also 
prone to manipulation.77  As statistician Richard Traflinger put it: 
You can find statistics that show cigarettes are killers and that they 
have no effect on anyone’s health.  You can find statistics that say 
you should cut down on the consumption of dairy products and 
that dairy products are good for you.  You can find statistics that 
prove that soft drinks will give you cancer and that they have no 
effect on anything but your thirst (or even that they make you 
thirstier).  Every one of these sets of statistics is absolutely true.78 
This is not to suggest that statistics are never trustworthy or reliable.  
On the contrary, as many courts have pointed out, statistical modeling enjoys 
a great deal of legitimacy and prestige as a reliable scientific tool in the 
realms of both academia and the law.79  Traflinger’s point, however, is that 
statistics can be fairly arcane and surprisingly complex, and laypersons can 
be misled by what they believe is a fairly straightforward statistical model.80  
This is especially important with regard to FCA litigation, where expert 
witnesses hired by the parties will perform the statistical modeling.  If 
statistics can be slanted in any variety of ways to prove the point that their 
proponent is attempting to establish, then their use in proving liability 
warrants caution and consideration. 
 
 73  Id. at 563. 
 74  Recent Case: False Claims Act - Proof of Liability - Eastern District of Tennessee 
Rules that Statistical Extrapolation May Suffice to Prove Liability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 
2080 (2015). 
 75  It is perhaps somewhat surprising that many of the courts addressing the statistical 
sampling question do not explicitly address the difference between using sampling for a 
damages calculation and using it to prove liability.  For courts that have accepted statistical 
sampling for proving liability, it appears implicit in their reasoning that scientific legitimacy 
is a major part of the reason why they have accepted it. 
 76  See Richard Traflinger, The Problems with Statistics, WASH. ST. UNIV. 
http://public.wsu.edu/~taflinge/evistats.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 77  See id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549, 
559–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2014). 
 80  Traflinger, supra note 76. 
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Statistics may also be suspect because they “do not tell the whole 
story,” especially concerning the relevance and validity of statistical 
comparisons.81  These observations are especially relevant in the context of 
statistical sampling, which necessarily involves comparisons between 
different types of claims.  Essentially, evidence of liability for one claim does 
not necessarily represent evidence of liability for another claim, especially 
where the two claims are factually distinct.  Indeed, statistics are especially 
suspect where evidence of a certain outcome in one situation is taken to mean 
evidence of the same outcome in a different situation,82 which is the exact 
methodology that would be used to prove liability in FCA cases. 
Furthermore, health care fraud cases pose their own unique problems 
with regard to the use of statistical sampling because it is very difficult for 
statisticians to create “truly representative” and homogenous samples in such 
cases.83  For example, it may be difficult for the statistician to differentiate—
at least in cases where the defendant health care provider controls multiple 
health care organizations—between “different state Medicaid programs that 
have different qualifying requirements [for purposes of Medicare and 
Medicaid billing],” as well as differences between “rural and suburban, as 
well as specialty, hospitals in [the] sample.”84  Simply put, it is difficult to 
extrapolate claims from a small sample when that sample is tenuously related 
to the larger universe of claims, such as where differences between hospitals, 
state laws, and billing requirements necessarily create differences that are 
exceptionally difficult to quantify in a statistical methodology.85  In this 
sense, complexity cuts both ways; claim-by-claim review may well be 
unfeasible in large and complex FCA health care fraud cases, but it is this 
same complexity that cautions against the free and uninhibited use of 
statistical sampling. 
This is not to say that statistical sampling should never be permissible.  
No evidentiary method is perfect, and it may well be said that it is up to the 
adversarial process, rather than trial courts, to find flaws in the propagated 
statistical sampling method.86  Still, the inherent problems with the use of 
statistics warrant, at the very least, a restrained approach.  This is especially 
 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Statisticians at DOJ may Overstate Case; 
Government’s Use of Statistical Sampling to Prove False Claims Act Liability, Damages May 
be Unreliable, if Not Impermissible, 21 NAT’L L.J. 22, 22 (1999). 
 84  See id. 
 85  See id. 
 86  See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549, 
560 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (“The opposing party can challenge the sample through cross-
examination of the proponent’s expert, presentation of its own expert, as well as other 
competing witnesses and evidence.”). 
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true in smaller cases with a manageable number of claims, where the 
problems associated with statistical sampling may outweigh the benefits. 
IV. REASONS FOR LIMITING THE USE OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
Courts have given a number of justifications for denying the use of 
statistical sampling, including concerns that the plaintiff has not met its 
burden of proof, the fact-specific nature of many FCA cases, the fact that 
statistical sampling is not a form of concrete evidence, and the requirement 
that plaintiffs must prove each individual claim on its own merits.87  The idea 
has also been put forward—by legal scholarship more than case law—that 
using statistical sampling to prove liability violates Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that fraud be pleaded with 
particularity.88  Finally, at the fringes of the argument is the concept that 
using statistical sampling to prove liability violates the defendant’s due 
process rights.89 
A. How the Fact-Specific Nature of Health Care Fraud Cases 
Warrants Against Statistical Sampling 
Many of the arguments espoused for prohibiting the use of statistical 
sampling stem from a little-known, unpublished, and seemingly innocuous 
case out of the District of Massachusetts, United States v. Friedman, in 
which the court declined the government’s request to extrapolate from a 
random sample of 350 out of a total of 676 claims prepared and analyzed by 
an expert witness.90  The court based this decision on the “existence at trial 
of discrete claims which were analyzed and discussed and subjected to cross 
examination” and which thus necessitated a claim-by-claim review.91  The 
trial judge added that, “[w]hile [he was] mindful of the government’s efforts 
to shorten the trial and present its evidence efficiently and clearly, [he was] 
reluctant to accept a statistical sampling as the basis for doubling the alleged 
overpayment without the same scrutiny and support [as that provided by 
 
 87  For the most concise arguments against the use of statistical sampling, see, for 
example, United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 848 
F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 533 F. 
Supp. 2d 12, 31 n.9 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21496 (D. Mass. July 23, 1993). 
 88  See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 83, at 22. 
 89  See id. (“[D]ue process arguments alone appear to be insufficient to preclude 
government use of random sampling.”); Martin, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (rejecting defendant’s 
due process claim). 
 90  Friedman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, at *9 n.1. 
 91  See id. 
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claim-by-claim review].”92  Sampling was not, however, one of the case’s 
main issues, and it was deemed by the trial judge as trivial enough to be 
relegated to a footnote.93 
This has not stopped courts from relying on Friedman’s reasoning.  In 
United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community, Inc.,94 the court 
“agree[d] with the analysis provided by the District Court in Friedman” and 
denied the plaintiffs’ request to use statistical sampling for proving 
liability.95  In applying the principles of Friedman to the facts of its own case, 
the court in Michaels noted that “the patients’ medical charts are all intact 
and available for review by either party,” and thus a claim-by-claim 
examination of each patient’s medical charts was necessary for determining 
liability.96  In a broader sense, the court’s holding seems to imply that 
extrapolation is not warranted in highly fact-sensitive cases where each claim 
is distinct, unique, and warrants individual examination.97 
Two other cases, United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington 
University and United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., also espouse these principles.  In El-Amin, the defendant health care 
organization was accused of overbilling for anesthesia services.98  The 
relators alleged that the defendants had defrauded Medicare by falsely 
representing that certain anesthesia procedures had been wholly performed 
by a licensed anesthesiologist, “when in fact portions of the procedure had 
been performed by residents or [nurse anesthetists].”99  Each claim thus 
necessarily turned on what type of procedure was being performed and who 
had performed it.100  In denying the use of statistical sampling, the court 
alluded to the fact-specific nature of the case, stating that “[f]or each claim, 
the Relators will be expected to provide, at a minimum, the date the claim 
was filed with Medicare, the name of the attending anesthesiologist, the type 
 
 92  See id. 
 93  See id. 
 94  United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 848 F.3d 
330 (4th Cir. 2017).  On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that “the relators’ appeal 
[as to the question of statistical sampling] does not present a pure question of law that is 
subject to our interlocutory review” and thus dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted.  
United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330, 341 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 95  Michaels, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *20. 
 96  See id. at *19–20. 
 97  Id. at *5 (“Each and every claim at issue in this case is fact-dependent and wholly 
unrelated to each and every other claim.”). 
 98  United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 533 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
 99  Id.  
 100  See id. at 18–19, 26–27.  
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of medical procedure involved, and the amount of the claim.”101  Similarly, 
the court in Hockett—a case concerning fraudulent activity related to the 
length of patient stays—declined to allow statistical sampling due in part to 
the highly fact-sensitive nature of the case.102  In particular, the court noted 
that in each particular claim, there could be “many other, completely 
innocuous alternative explanations for the increased length of patient stays – 
such as the patients just getting sicker.”103  Thus, with the facts for each claim 
in doubt, the court opted for a traditional claim-by-claim review as opposed 
to statistical sampling. 
As demonstrated in Michaels, El-Amin, and Hockett, statistical 
sampling is perhaps a poor tool in cases where there are large numbers of 
separate and distinct claims.  The courts in these cases seemed to be in 
agreement that the presence of discrete and factually sensitive claims 
warranted a claim-by-claim analysis of the relevant evidence.  To submit 
such fact-intensive inquires to a broad and sweeping extrapolation test is 
simply counterintuitive, and the principle behind statistical extrapolation—
that a small sample can be necessarily representative of a larger sample—
loses much of its steam when applied to a situation where each item within 
the sample is distinctive from every other.104 
B. The Need for Concrete Evidence in FCA Cases 
Closely related to the issue of fact-specificity is the necessity, at least 
in the belief of some courts, for the government and private relators to prove 
FCA claims with specific and concrete evidence.105  In Hockett, for instance, 
the court held that “[w]elding different inferences together [through 
statistical sampling] cannot substitute for direct proof.”106  Moreover, the 
court stated that it was “imperative for [the] relator to produce real evidence 
to support her contention that patients were actually held longer than 
necessary” as part of the defendant’s scheme to defraud the government.107  
 
 101  Id. at 31 n.9. 
 102  See United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 
2d 25, 65–66 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 103  Id. at 66. 
 104  Statistical sampling works best where the sample is truly representative of the whole 
and where there is a great degree of homogeneity.  Highly discrete and fact-sensitive claims 
necessarily obfuscate the certainty with which the statistical model can be said to be 
homogenous and representative of the whole.  See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 105  The issues of fact-specificity and the need for concrete evidence converge, and at times 
conflate, at many points. This is due to the fact that highly fact-specific claims necessarily 
entail a great deal of evidence.  As a result, many courts dealing with a highly fact-specific 
set of claims often raise the additional issue of the need for concrete evidence in proving each 
specific claim. 
 106  Hockett, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
 107  Id.  
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Though the court was cognizant of the fact that “where some degree of 
liability is conceded, slight deviations from traditional modes of proof are 
tolerable,”108 it nevertheless held firm in its holding that statistical sampling 
could not by itself form a basis for liability in the absence of direct proof and 
concrete evidence.109 
United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Illinois., Inc., a case 
out of the Seventh Circuit, further expounded on these principles.  In Crews, 
the plaintiff-relators brought suit against a pharmaceutical company for the 
illegal recycling and repurposing of prescription drugs.110  The plaintiff’s 
statistical sampling methodology was based on the assertion that “[a]ll 
claims for recycled and redispensed [sic] medications . . . are false claims” 
as a matter of law.111  Working off of this assumption, the plaintiffs then 
calculated the number of false claims based on the percentage of patients on 
Medicaid and the percentage of dispensed medications returned unused.112  
The plaintiffs next argued that the result of this calculation conclusively 
“prove[d] that [six percent] to [twelve percent] of recycled drugs would have 
been [re]distributed to Medicaid recipients” had it not been for the 
defendant’s fraudulent activity, and that the defendant was thus liable to this 
extent.113  In upholding the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff 
could not simply rely on a bare calculation to prove liability, but rather had 
the burden of establishing liability with proof of actual false claims.114 
C. The Strange Case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
The need for concrete evidence to prove liability in FCA cases may also 
have a statutory basis in the form of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 
which states in pertinent part: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”115  
Thus, “[u]nder Rule 9(b), mere conclusory allegations of falsity are 
insufficient; rather, the plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading 
about a statement, and why it is false.”116  The mandate of Rule 9(b) would 
apply to statistical sampling in the sense that each claim must be proven on 
 
 108  Id. at 67. 
 109  See id. at 65–67. 
 110  United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853, 854–55 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
 111  Id. at 856. 
 112  Id.  
 113  Id. 
 114  Id.; see also United States ex rel. Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (W.D. 
Okla. 1998) (declining to allow a pure percentage calculation to prove liability). 
 115  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 116  Behre & Ifrah, supra note 83, at 22. 
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its own terms; liability cannot be proven for a particular claim simply 
through extrapolation based on a statistical model.  The Department of 
Justice originally took the position that Rule 9(b) did not apply to cases 
brought under the FCA.117  A string of court rulings in the late 1990s, 
however, made clear that Rule 9(b) did, in fact, apply to FCA cases.118 
At least one court has endorsed the view that Rule 9(b) prohibits the 
use of statistical sampling to prove liability.  In United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff-relator alleged 
that the defendant physician had violated the FCA by submitting claims for 
unnecessary services.119  To support these allegations, the plaintiff put 
forward as evidence a statistical calculation showing that “in reasonable 
probability . . . approximately [forty] percent of claims submitted by 
defendants for services rendered . . . were for services that were not 
medically necessary.”120  In affirming a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s 
claims, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because he “provided no factual basis 
for his belief that defendants submitted claims for medically unnecessary 
services other than his reference to statistical studies.”121  The plaintiff’s 
“allegations, therefore, amount[ed] to nothing more than speculation.”122 
But neither Thompson nor its approach to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) has remained relevant in the debate over statistical sampling, 
despite it being a well-reasoned appellate decision and a seemingly perfect 
case for courts looking to add precedential support to a holding that statistical 
sampling cannot be used for purposes of proving liability.123  Indeed, despite 
its seeming relevancy, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) has faded 
entirely from both the case law and scholarship related to statistical 
sampling.124  It is thus fair to say at this point in the debate that whether a 
court is willing to allow statistical sampling will depend almost entirely on 
its own judgment of the need for concrete evidence for proving specific 
claims. 
 
 
 117  Id. 
 118  See id. 
 119  United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 
901 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 120  Id. at 903. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Thompson, despite being a relatively older case, is not cited, either positively or 
negatively, in any other case appearing in this Comment. 
 124  Thompson is the only case appearing in this comment that interprets Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) as having any effect on the use of statistical sampling in FCA cases. 
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D. Possible Shortcomings in Cases that Have Disallowed Statistical 
Sampling 
Much like the cases that have allowed statistical sampling, the cases 
that have disallowed the use of statistical sampling have not provided a clear 
and workable framework for when statistical sampling should be permitted 
and when it should not.  Also, many, if not all, of the courts that have 
prohibited statistical sampling for proving liability have largely ignored or 
dismissed out-of-hand many of the strongest arguments espousing its 
permissibility, such as the fact that claim-by-claim review may be impossible 
where there is a large universe of claims.125  Nor have these courts addressed 
the idea that statistical sampling may be warranted in a case where the claims 
are not highly fact-specific, and thus evidence of guilt in one claim 
necessarily implies evidence of guilt in the entire universe of claims.126  
These courts have thus warned of the dangers of statistical sampling—
dangers which may well be relevant to the facts of the case at hand127—
without contemplating that there may be fact patterns where these dangers 
are extremely limited or totally non-existent.  And simply because statistical 
sampling is not warranted—or is somehow dubious—as applied to a 
particular case, does not necessarily mean that it is never warranted in any 
case. 
V. A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
That courts have come out differently on the matter of statistical 
sampling does not necessarily mean that one side or the other is deciding the 
cases incorrectly.  On the contrary, the different outcomes may be explained 
by fundamentally different sets of facts, where the problems of one approach 
are clearly evident and the problems of the other approach are minimal.  The 
problem, it may be said, is not so much one of legal and interpretational 
conflict as much as it is the lack of a unifying principle for determining when 
statistical sampling can be used and when it cannot.  This may be due to the 
fact that most of the courts that have decided issues related to statistical 
 
 125  But see United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-
JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *18  (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (inferring that statistical 
sampling may be permissible where evidence has been destroyed), interlocutory appeal 
dismissed, 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 126  This is perhaps due in part to the fact that the courts that have disallowed the use of 
statistical sampling have not confronted a case in which the universe of claims was 
sufficiently homogenous.  See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n.1 (D. Mass. July 23, 1993) (emphasis added) (noting the “existence 
at trial of discrete claims”). 
 127  See United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 
2d 25, 66 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting a concern that statistical sampling allows a finding of liability 
through merely “[w]elding different inferences together”). 
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sampling are district courts, and there is thus less of an impetus in creating 
law—and thus a unified framework—than there is in simply deciding the 
case correctly on its facts. 
The ensuing framework that forms the basis for this portion of the 
Comment will be an attempt to consolidate the various competing factors on 
both sides of the statistical sampling debate.  Ultimately, it will call for a 
restrained approach to the use of statistical sampling, placing the burden on 
the plaintiff to show why the use of statistical sampling is warranted.  In 
meeting this burden, the plaintiff will have to show some form of undue 
hardship that necessitates the use of statistical sampling.  Finally, in 
determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court should look 
to three categories: (1) the number of claims; (2) whether the level of fact-
specificity and the discreteness of the individual claims is such that claim-
by-claim review is necessary; and (3) other factors that may bear on the total 
outcome of the case, such as bad faith or consent of the parties.  The effect 
of this framework, at least in a theoretical sense, will be to allow statistical 
sampling where it is necessary as the only viable way to ensure recovery, 
while denying the use of statistical sampling in cases where claim-by-claim 
review is feasible and necessary. 
A. The Need for a Cautious Approach to Statistical Sampling 
It would not be unfair to ask why the plaintiff should have the burden 
of demonstrating that statistical sampling should be used in a given case.  
Indeed, it has been argued that there is nothing wrong with using a 
“straightforward application of a long-standing and highly efficient 
[methodology] . . . . to efficiently and accurately provide evidence as to 
liability.”128  The answer lies in the fact that proving liability is a 
fundamentally different matter from proving damages.  It is one thing to 
allow a statistical model for a damages calculation where liability has already 
been proven; it is quite another to allow a statistical model as the only means 
of proving liability, and without any claim-by-claim examination.  Proving 
liability implicates concerns, problems, and procedural requirements that 
simply do not factor into a damages analysis.129  This is especially true given 
the “quasi-criminal” nature of the FCA.130  Indeed, the argument could be 
made “that such extrapolation would unfairly, or at least prematurely, shift 
the burden to the [defendant].”131  Simply put, the speed and efficiency of 
statistical sampling is not worth its procedural infirmities in cases where 
claim-by-claim review is otherwise available.  It is therefore necessary for 
 
 128  Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
 129  See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 83, at 22. 
 130  See id. 
 131  See id. 
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the plaintiff to show something more—some form of hardship—before 
statistical sampling is warranted. 
Courts endorsing the use of statistical sampling have tried to argue 
around the issue of burden shifting.  In Martin for instance, the court argued 
that no burden shifting had taken place because the defendant still had “the 
opportunity to depose the Government’s expert, challenge the qualifications 
of the Government’s expert, retain its own expert, and to present all of this 
evidence at trial.”132  The court further solidified its approach to the subject 
by noting that the jury would provide a necessary check on the potential 
abuses of statistical sampling.133  But this perhaps misses the point.  If 
statistical sampling is not necessary, or even unwarranted in a particular case, 
there is simply no valid reason to complicate the matter and risk confusing 
the jury solely in the name of efficiency.  This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that statistical sampling methodology can be quite complicated.134  It is 
not a stretch to say that a jury will be inclined to believe, perhaps without 
question, an expert’s declaration that a defendant is liable for a certain 
percentage of the total number of claims.  If the defendant calls an expert 
witness to dispute the plaintiff expert’s methodology, then the case will 
devolve into a mathematical dispute even where there is readily available 
evidence to assess each claim on its own merits.  This result is simply 
untenable where the plaintiff has not shown that statistical sampling is 
necessary. 
It has also been argued that statistical sampling is necessary as a 
deterrent to stop the widespread perpetuation of fraud and to ensure that the 
government receives a full recovery of the money it has lost through fraud.135  
This is certainly true of cases where there are a large number of homogenous 
claims.136  It is far less certain in cases with a smaller number of discrete 
claims.  More importantly, this argument ignores the fact that the FCA 
contains both a treble damages provision as well as the potential for 
significant fines.137  This means that for every claim where liability is found 
the government is receiving essentially three claims worth of recovery, even 
without consideration of potential fines.  This greatly undermines any notion 
that statistical sampling is necessary as a deterrent or as a way of assuring 
 
 132  United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 549, 570 
(E.D. Tenn. 2014). 
 133  Id. at 572. 
 134  See United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-1303-T-
23TBM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55384, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015) (explaining the 
complex methodology of statistical sampling through expert witness testimony). 
 135  See Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
 136  See id. (arguing that statistical sampling is especially warranted in cases where there 
are a large number of claims). 
 137  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
REILLY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2017  8:33 PM 
2017] COMMENT 1123 
full recovery.  On the contrary, it may be argued that the use of statistical 
sampling in conjunction with fines and treble damages is quite plainly 
punitive.138 
B. Determining Whether the Plaintiff Has Met the Burden of 
Establishing that Statistical Sampling is Warranted 
With the need for a restrained approach to statistical sampling—and 
thus a presumption against its use—now established, it is now necessary to 
provide an analysis of the factors courts must consider in determining 
whether the plaintiff has successfully met its burden of showing that 
statistical sampling is warranted by the facts of the case.  The ensuing three-
factor test is a synthesis of the various concerns and considerations framing 
the statistical sampling debate.  It is designed to provide a flexible framework 
that can be applied to the facts of any given case.  No factor in this test is 
solely determinative, and it is open to a significant amount of interpretation.  
This malleability is necessary, however, given the wide range of factual 
scenarios arising in health care fraud cases.  It should be noted that, before 
this three-factor test can be applied, the plaintiffs must prove liability in at 
least one instance.139  A bare statistical calculation applied to the entire 
universe of claims will not suffice without an underlying finding of liability 
based on some form of concrete evidence.140 
1. The Number of Claims 
There is an unavoidable connection between the number of claims in a 
case and the fact-specificity of the claims at issue.  On one hand, a high 
number of claims undoubtedly warrant the use of statistical sampling.141  On 
the other hand, a universe of highly discrete claims warrants claim-by-claim 
review.142  It seems clear, however, that where claim-by-claim review is 
completely untenable due to a large number of claims, statistical sampling is 
warranted.143  This is especially true considering the fact that “large-scale 
perpetrators of fraud would reap the benefits” of a system that did not allow 
statistical sampling in cases with a large number of claims, “because the 
 
 138  See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 83, at 22 (arguing that the government’s use of a 
“bloated damages provision which is the trebled” is primarily a way of strong-arming 
defendants into settlements). 
 139  See United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853, 856 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
 140  See supra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
 141  See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 142  See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text. 
 143  United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549, 565 
(E.D. Tenn. 2014) (arguing that statistical sampling is warranted where there is not a 
sufficiently limited universe of claims). 
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government could not possibly pursue each individual false claim.”144  
Indeed, it may be said that Martin, in allowing extrapolation to the tens of 
thousands of total claims at issue, “ensured perpetrators of fraud would not 
be able to escape liability because of the broad scope of their fraud.”145  At 
the same time, Michaels, in not allowing a statistical model to extrapolate 
for thousands of claims at issue, may well have been wrongly decided.146 
The point at which the number of total claims makes claim-by-claim 
review untenable will be a function of the claims’ overall discreteness.  A 
high number of discrete, fact-specific claims will require a greater number 
of total claims before the court determines that claim-by-claim review is 
unfeasible.  Conversely, the court can allow statistical sampling for a much 
lower number of claims where the claims at issue are largely homogenous.147  
In this way, the first factor of the framework serves the double purpose of 
allowing statistical sampling where it is absolutely necessary or where the 
risks are relatively small, while also protecting against its use where the 
claims’ discreteness warrants a greater deference to claim-by-claim review. 
2. Whether the Level of Fact-Specificity and the Discreteness of 
the Individual Claims is Such that Claim-by-Claim Review 
is Necessary 
The second part of the framework is designed to ensure that statistical 
sampling will rarely, if ever, be used where claim-by-claim review is 
feasible.  The only exception would be where the claims are so homogenous 
in nature that proof of liability in one claim necessarily means a proof of 
liability in all, or at least a substantial number, of claims.148  The principle 
behind this factor is simply that it runs counter to the basic and long-
established principles of American jurisprudence to relieve the plaintiff from 
presenting specific evidence for each individual claim when such evidence 
is readily available.149  Had statistical sampling been used in cases such as 
Michaels or El-Amin, the court would have essentially been allowing an 
 
 144  Id. at 571. 
 145  Recent Case: False Claims Act, supra note 74. 
 146  See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *3 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (“The total number of claims 
involved in the trial will be staggering.”), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 848 F.3d 330 (4th 
Cir. 2017). 
 147  See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 148  See United States v. Chen, 402 F. App’x 185, 188–89 (9th Cir. 2010) (statistical 
sampling used at trial where defendant physician conceded that the services provided were 
the same for each claim at issue). 
 149  See Michaels, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *19–20 (disallowing the use of 
statistical sampling where specific evidence, including patient medical charts, were available 
for the parties’ review). 
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inference to take the place of readily available hard evidence.150  While there 
is an understandable need for expediency in litigation, the price of ignoring 
especially relevant evidence in the place of an inference hardly seems worth 
the risk.  In essence, the plaintiff will be unable to meet its burden of 
demonstrating that statistical sampling is warranted so long as the total 
number of claims is manageable in number and sufficiently discrete and 
heterogeneous in composition. 
It should also be made clear exactly what is meant by terms such as 
“fact-specificity” and “discreteness.”  For purposes of this framework, these 
terms apply to the level of homogeneity within a particular universe of 
claims.  For example, a defendant in a particular case may provide only one 
type of health care service and the claims at issue may apply to only one type 
of treatment or billing procedure.151  In such a case, there would be a high 
level of homogeneity in the total universe of claims because every claim at 
issue relates to roughly the same type of fraudulent activity conducted in 
roughly the same way.  The fact-specificity and discreteness of each 
individual claim would therefore be relatively small. 
By contrast, a particular universe of claims may be highly discrete 
where the defendant operates multiple businesses in multiple states and in 
varying forms of health care practice and treatment.152  In such an instance, 
a statistical model based on data from a specific institution in a specific state 
would have little relation to other claims stemming from other institutions in 
other states.  A trial court would thus be forced to determine whether 
statistical sampling is feasible given the defendant’s complex administrative 
scheme. 
3. Other Mitigating Factors 
This third category is designed as a catchall category for any number 
of extenuating circumstances that may warrant the use of statistical 
sampling.  For instance, statistical sampling would be perfectly permissible 
where the defendant has consented to its use.153  Likewise, statistical 
sampling would be permissible where a default judgment has been entered 
 
 150  See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
 151  See Chen, 185 Fed. App’x at 188–89 (conveying how the jury found the physician 
liable under the FCA for submitting 3,544 false claims, but the parties only analyzed 37 claims 
at trial after the physician conceded that the referral request and services provided were the 
same for each of these claims). 
 152  See United States ex rel. Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (W.D. Okla. 
1998) (noting that the defendant’s interstate business model greatly complicated the use of 
statistical sampling). 
 153  See United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) supplemented, 909 F. 
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d in part and remanded, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(defendant physician consented to sampling).  
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against the defendant.154  It would also be warranted where there has been 
bad faith on the part of the defendants, or where the destruction of evidence 
has left the plaintiff, through no fault of its own, with no other feasible means 
of proving liability.155  Courts should use caution and restraint, however, in 
deciding when novel circumstances call for the use of statistical sampling for 
proving liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Statistical sampling has the potential to be an extremely powerful tool 
if permitted for use in proving liability in FCA cases.156  As such, its 
application warrants a great degree of thoughtfulness, lest its uninhibited use 
become a vehicle for abuse.  The fact that statistical sampling carries with it 
both numerous benefits and numerous drawbacks only creates further 
complexity.  And with health care fraud cases increasing each year, the need 
for a resolution to the divided view on statistical sampling is not only 
necessary, but also pressing. 
By creating a unified framework under which all statistical sampling 
cases can be analyzed, this Comment hopes to bridge the divide between the 
courts by expounding a set of principles that allows for statistical sampling 
when the benefits are large and the risks are small, and which prohibits 
statistical sampling where the benefits are slight and the risks are pervasive.  
Ultimately, this framework seeks to ensure the dual purposes of not allowing 
“widespread fraud to go unpunished,”157 while also minimizing the risk that 
plaintiffs will be able to bypass traditional procedural safeguards where 
doing so would not be helpful or necessary.158  The result is a standard for 
analyzing statistical sampling that ensures fundamental fairness for the 
parties, predictable results, and a stable set of enduring principles against 
which future claims can be analyzed. 
 
 
 
 154  See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 (D.P.R. 2000) (basing 
damages calculation off of estimated overpayments after entry of a default judgment). 
 155  See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *19–20 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (inferring that use of 
statistical sampling would be proper where evidence has been destroyed), interlocutory 
appeal dismissed, 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 156  Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
 157  Michaels, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379, at *19. 
 158  See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 83, at 22 (implying that statistical sampling affords 
defendants insufficient process). 
